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 1 Introduction
In imperfectly competitive markets, wages and prices can be set according to the market power
of participants. The e¢ ciency cost and the redistribution e⁄ects are not always those desired
by the government or by society. In transition economies, the inheritance from central planning
made market power a central issue; competition could not be taken for granted. Moreover,
the rede￿nition of property rights and the liberalization of wages and prices could a⁄ect the
objectives and the bargaining power of employers, employees and consumers drastically. A
speci￿c problem with wage liberalization in state ￿rms could be the decapitalization of the ￿rm
by the workers. In transition economies inheriting no unemployment, layo⁄s were bound to
increase due to reallocation needs across ￿rms in transition, but market power of ￿rms on the
goods market and of unions on the labor market could make unemployment needlessly high.
In this context, and out of fear for excessive wage increases, most transition economies
introduced some form of wage norm, usually at the ￿rm-level, and enforced it trough taxes on
the part of the wage bill or of the average wage which exceeded the norm (Coricelli and Revenga,
1992). Before the major transition of the 1990￿ s, Hungary pioneered the system with its ￿rst
market reforms in 1968 (Adam, 1974) and Poland followed (Rutkowski, 1994). Poland made
heavy use of an excess wage tax in 1990 and 1991. There, in 1990, the norm and the tax were
based on the wage bill of each ￿rm, in an environment starting with o¢ cially no unemployment.
In 1991, Poland switched to the average wage of each ￿rm as the reference. Between 1992 and
1994, it slowly dismantled the system, while many observers estimate that ￿rms and unions
adjusted quite fast to the new market system.1 In Eastern Germany, after reuni￿cation, wages
were raised in an attempt to accelerate convergence between East and West. There, Akerlof,
Rose, Yellen and Hessenius (1991) suggested a wage subsidy to help ￿rms cope with this wage
shock as long as productivity had not recovered.
In this paper, we extend the literature on wage setting and excess-wage taxation in a tran-
sition economy by looking more speci￿cally at the labor-demand e⁄ects of a tax-enforced wage
norm at the level of the ￿rm, as it was implemented in Poland in 1990 and 1991. We show that
the tax a⁄ects the labor demand perceived by the unions and display the condition such that
it increases equilibrium employment at the level of the ￿rm in the right-to-manage bargaining
model. We also prove that in the e¢ cient bargaining model, the mechanism can only lead to an
employment increase if the tax may be turned into a subsidy.
Section 2 reviews historical attempts to de￿ne and implement excess wage taxes or wage
growth taxes and discusses the related literature. Section 3 de￿nes the tax and the wage norm
and shows how the tax-enforced wage norm a⁄ects the labor demand perceived by the union.
Section 4 analyzes the tax mechanism under di⁄erent wage and labor bargaining models. It
1Basu, Estrin and Svejnar (1997) point to the role of market variables in labor demand equations and the
insigni￿cant or low e⁄ect of lagged values. Grosfeld and Nivet (1999) ￿nd a market-like wage equation but note
insider power in the appropriation of productivity gains. Pinto, Belka and Krajewski (1993) insist on the forward
looking behavior of managers preparing for privatization and avoiding decapitalization.
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1demonstrates the positive employment e⁄ect of the norm if the latter can either lead to a tax
or a subsidy. If only the tax case is considered, the labor demand curve is kinked and the
mechanism can a⁄ect positively employment only in the right-to-manage bargaining model.
Section 5 provides an empirical test of the e⁄ect of the wage norm for a sample of Polish ￿rms.
It con￿rms the relevance of our theoretical analysis centred on the perceived labor demand.
The concluding section highlights the employment e⁄ect at the core of our contribution to the
understanding of the tax-enforced wage norm.
2 Historical perspective and elements of literature
In market economies, tax-based income policies under the form of a tax on wage increases
attracted a lot of attention, especially in the context of rising in￿ ation in the 1970￿ s (Seidman
1978). The tax was then studied as an instrument to ￿ght in￿ ation but also as a way to obtain a
lower level of unemployment. The idea that a tax on wage increases could a⁄ect the bargaining
strategy of a union that cares both about employment and about wages was suggested by
Wallich and Weintraub (1971) and modelled by Kotowitz and Portes (1974) in an intertemporal
framework with rates of change of wages as the main target. The tighter monetary and ￿scal
policies of the late 1980￿ s and of the 1990￿ s reduced the in￿ ation rate as well as the attention for
wage controls, as anticipated by Isard (1973). Then, international trade pressures and domestic
competition policies also weakened wage claims.
Interest for the interaction between competition policies and market openness on the one
hand and workers welfare and bargaining power on the other hand has been revived by the
pressure of globalization in industrial economies and by the disappointment with the growth
performance of Europe (Sapir et al., 2004). In France, reform fatigue after two decennia of partial
liberalization also called for a better understanding of the forces at work on the goods and labor
markets (Blanchard, 2004). Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) show (pp. 892-893) that a reduction
of the entry costs of ￿rms or of the bargaining power of workers increases entry and product
market competition, hence reduces the mark-up of ￿rms and the unemployment rate while
nevertheless increasing the purchasing power of wages (thanks to lower consumption prices).
They also show that there can be a positive e⁄ect on employment and on real consumption of a
reduced bargaining power of workers but that it is slower than this of entry of ￿rms (as it works
through the increased pro￿tability of entry).
In transition economies, especially in Poland, the excess-wage tax has been triggered by the
government￿ s fear of in￿ ationary wage increases after the 1989 jump to the market economy.
This fear compares with the market economies of the 1970￿ s, but was even more understandable
in initial conditions of low competition on the labor market and on the goods market. Next
to in￿ ation, the importance of enterprise pro￿tability and of employment issues in transition
economies was recognized early on by the governments and in the literature. Pinto, Belka and
Krajewski (1993) studied a sample of state enterprises and found strong upward wage pressure
but also a desire of the managers to present ￿rms in good health for privatization. A ￿ strong
3
2budget constraint￿(Kornai, 1990) was soon perceived by most ￿rms and recognized to be a major
equilibrium factor in wage negotiations as in Pinto and van Wijnbergen (1995) and Corricelli
and Lane (1993) among others.
Aghion and Blanchard (1994) model the substitution of jobs in state ￿rms by jobs in the pri-
vate sector. They show that workers who fear income losses may oppose desirable restructuring
in state ￿rms if unemployment is too high. They suggest (p. 307) that wage controls in state
￿rms may make restructuring and privatization of state ￿rms more attractive to their workers
by reducing unemployment risk. Boeri and Terell (2002) point that unemployment and wages
should not be too high but not too low either, as wage increases and temporary unemployment
contribute to the restructuring and growth process. High unemployment may feed undesirable
unemployment persistence after a shock, as has been observed in other European economies in
the 1980￿ s (among others Blanchard and Summers, 1986). Political economy arguments also
plead for a low rate of unemployment to avoid that reformers would be voted out (Dewatripont
and Roland, 1992). Castanheira (2003) shows in a stylized general equilibrium model with labor
market imperfections how employment destruction can be slowed and capital accumulation can
be supported. He suggests moderate subsidies to ￿rms, an active use of indirect taxes and he
sees a role for taxes on wage increases.
In the transition context of 1990-1991 Poland, the bene￿cial employment e⁄ect of a tax on
excess wages shall have occurred through a slower pace of job destruction in the state sector,
as long as the private sector was not yet able to create enough new jobs. Average private
sector wages remained indeed below state enterprise averages for a long time. The wage and
employment e⁄ect may have contributed to private sector entry by keeping wages a⁄ordable to
new investors, while not falling into the trap of low wages and low restructuring documented by
Boeri and Terell (2002) for other countries. Moreover, many state ￿rms may have been protected
from early decapitalization (Pinto, Belka and Krajewski, 1993 and Castanheira, 2003).
Excess-wage taxes are unpopular despite their positive employment e⁄ects, their ability to
strengthen the bargaining position of weaker asset owners and their role in favour of long run
competitiveness of wages. A reason for the lack of popular support may be the negative e⁄ect
of the tax on e⁄ort in an e¢ ciency-wage world, as noted by Jackman and Layard (1990). This
e⁄ect sets employers on the same side as employees against the tax, especially if the norm is
perceived as too low. Pinto and van Wijnbergen (1995) note indeed that most Polish employers
of the Pinto, Belka and Krajewski (1993) sample would have increased wages if the excess wage
tax had not been in force.
The di¢ culty to de￿ne the right norm level is one of the main practical arguments against
a wage norm, and this probably explains why wage norms usually do not last many years.2 If
norms are not abandoned, they tend to be replaced by more ￿ exible or negotiated guidelines.3 In
2In Poland, the tax raised around 2 percent of GDP of tax revenue Ebrill et al. (1995) report 1.5 percent of
GDP for 1990 and 3.3 percent of GDP for 1991.
3For example Belgium introduced a wage-growth norm at the macroeconomic level in the ￿ competitiveness
law￿of 1996. It did this in the context of a public debt above 100 percent of GDP and of a rate of unemployment
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3addition, perverse de￿nitions should be avoided. Establishing the norm on the wage bill instead
of the average wage may discourage employment (Lane, 1994). A wage-growth norm may be
hard to enforce if ￿rms and unions ￿nd how to play with the ￿scal calendar to minimize their
tax liabilities.4
It is also worth noting that progressive income taxes on labor, which are common in industrial
countries, may have the same elasticity-increasing e⁄ect on labor demand as an excess-wage
tax, since the top rate kicks in only above a pre-set income level. Such taxes may a⁄ect wage
agreements between unions and ￿rms or between unions and governments in the direction of wage
moderation and of job creation. There are thus labor demand e⁄ects of labor income taxation
and not just labor supply e⁄ects as pointed by Hungerbuehler et al. (2003) or Aronsson et al.
(1997). Lockwood and Manning (1993, p. 27) even suggest that the relatively low unemployment
rate of the Scandinavian countries may be explained by their high marginal tax rates relative to
the average tax rate.5
The literature thus suggests that in a transition economy, the excess-wage tax can work as
a temporary substitute for competition through its e⁄ect on the union￿ s perception of the labor
demand. It is worth formalizing this argument and testing the e⁄ect of the tax on the labor
demand in the following sections.
3 The pivotal role of the norm
There have been numerous formulations of taxes on wage increases or on excess wages. The
policy we study in this paper is the one implemented in Poland in 1990 and in 1991. It was
nicknamed ￿popiwek￿after its abbreviation PPWW. A wage norm x was de￿ned for each ￿rm.
Below the norm, no speci￿c tax or subsidy applied. Above the norm, progressive tax rates
well above one hundred percent applied to the parts of the wage expenditure of the ￿rm which
exceeded the norm and its prede￿ned multiples. To focus on the main e⁄ect of the system, we
will model the tax as if only one tax rate applied. Hence we can de￿ne the gross wage wg as:
that was perceived as excessive (above 10 percent despite a massive use of early retirement schemes). The wage
growth norm of this small open economy is based on the wage growth of its four main trading partners.
4The Polish excess wage tax was not a tax on wage increases but well a tax on wage deviations from a
norm. This di⁄ers from most of the schemes studied in the 1970￿ s (Kotowitz and Portes, 1974, Oswald, 1984,
Jackman and Layard, 1990). Another distinction with the 1970￿ s is that the tax a⁄ected the cash ￿ ow of the ￿rm
independently of its pro￿tability. Some loss-making ￿rms were also subject to the tax. By contrast, the proposal
of Wallich and Weintraub (1971) operated as a corporate pro￿t tax : an extra tax rate ￿ on pro￿ts (in percent)
was calculated as a multiple ￿ of the di⁄erence between the growth rate of the wages in the ￿rm during the ￿scal
year and the allowed growth rate of wages in the ￿rm. The actual tax liability for a given deviation would decline
when pro￿t falls.
5The de￿nition of the wage brackets for progressive taxation is also an issue, similar to the problem of setting
the wage norm. With the ratio of the marginal tax rate to the (e⁄ective) average tax rate, theory provides a
useful indictor, expost. Most progressive taxation systems actually include other sources of income than labor
income, which may weaken their e⁄ect on wage arrangements.
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4wg = wn + T (1)
with wn, the average net wage and T, the per worker tax revenue. This tax revenue is simply
proportional to the part of the average net wage wn exceeding the ￿rm-speci￿c norm, x, ￿xed
by the government :
T = ￿(wn ￿ x) (2)
with ￿, the tax rate. From this expression, we can easily imagine the case of a subsidy for ￿rms
paying an average net wage under the norm (wn < x). To our knowledge such a subsidy has
never been applied. Nevertheless it corresponds to the scheme proposed for East Germany by
Ackerlof et al. (1991). In this paper we proceed with the analysis of both cases: without and
with discontinuity at the point where the net wage falls below the norm. The empirical tests on
the polish experience are restricted to the tax case (wn ￿ x).
Let us consider a production function f(l) for the ￿rm, increasing and concave in l. For a
pro￿t maximizing ￿rm, the labor demand is obtained as
fl(l) = wg or equivalently l(wg) = f￿1
l (wg) (3)
which is downward sloping and convex.
The tax-enforced wage norm a⁄ects the perception of the labor demand by the unions. Let￿ s
de￿ne lg = f￿1
l (wg) as the labor demand expressed by the ￿rm in function of the gross wage,
and ln = f￿1
l (wn) as the labor demand curve perceived by the union. The e⁄ect of the tax is
summarized in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: For any downward-sloping labor demand curve in the wage/employment space, the
intersection between the net and gross labor demand curves ln and lg occurs at the level of the
norm, while the net curves are always ￿atter than the corresponding gross curve for any value
of l di⁄erent from the intersection value.
Proof. The relation (1) between the net wage wn and the gross wage wg for any level of
employment l, using the de￿nition of the tax (2) can be expressed as
wn(l) =
wg(l) + ￿x
1 + ￿
(4)
or similarly
l￿1
n =
l￿1
g + ￿x
1 + ￿
(5)
with l￿1
g and l￿1
n the corresponding inverse labor demands.
The two di⁄erent perceptions of the labor demand curve can also be expressed in terms of
di⁄erent perceptions of the elasticity of demand. As most people expected (for example Akerlof
et al., 1991), the tax or subsidy increases the wage elasticity of labor demand and can make the
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5unions more cautious in their wage demands. This pivotal role of the tax-enforced norm will
also guide the empirical test at the end of this paper.
In expression (5) we can distinguish two wedges between ln and lg : ￿rst a tax rate e⁄ect
(1 + ￿) as for any proportional tax and second a norm leverage e⁄ect ￿x=(1 + ￿) speci￿c to
the present excess wage tax. For any downward-sloping labor demand curve, the tax-rate e⁄ect
makes the l￿1
n curve ￿ atter than the l￿1
g curve in the wage-labor space, and the norm leverage
e⁄ect ensures that labor demand curves cross each other at the norm x where wn = x = wg.
Accordingly, this intersection point moves with the level of the norm x. For higher levels of
employment (and lower wages) the tax becomes a subsidy (T = ￿(wn￿x) < 0), which eventually
ensures a ￿ oor for the net wage. Indeed, setting the gross wage wg equal to zero in expression
(4) shows that the net wage is bounded :
wg ￿ 0 , wn ￿
￿x
1 + ￿
. (6)
This lower bound on the net wage corresponds to the subsidy per worker that is implied by the
norm x and the tax (subsidy) rate ￿. For an isoelastic labor demand, there is no upper bound
for the net wage, but employment tends to zero for in￿nitely high wages.
In the next section, we analyze the e⁄ect of the tax on wage excess in di⁄erent wage-labor
bargaining set-ups.
4 Labor and wage bargaining
We follow Calvo (1978) and assume the trade union maximizes the di⁄erence between the wage
of its l employed members and a reservation wage !. It is a special case of a more general view
of a union caring about employment and wages; indeed it corresponds to an equal weighting of
wages and employment in the utility function of the union. When considering the behavior of
a union at the ￿rm-level (instead of at the national level) it is more realistic to assume that it
takes positive outside opportunities into account, hence a non-zero reservation wage.
Interestingly, under this assumption for the objective function of the trade union, the e⁄ect
of the norm and tax on the union marginal revenue curve mimics this observed for the labor
demand curve.
Lemma 2: If the trade union objective is to maximize the di⁄erence between the wage of its
employed members and a reservation wage, the pivotal role of the norm on the labor demand
curve is transmitted to the union marginal revenue curve.
Proof. The net and gross marginal revenues mn and mg are respectively
mn = wn + l@wn
@l ￿ ! mg = wg + l
@wg
@l ￿ !
= l￿1
n + l@l￿1
n
@l ￿ ! = l￿1
g + l
@l￿1
g
@l ￿ !
7
6and combining these expressions with (5) yields
mn =
mg + ￿x
1 + ￿
.
Lemma 1 and Lemma 2 are illustrated on Figure 1. On the Figure we do not report the
marginal revenue curves, but instead these curves augmented of the reservation wage !, de￿ned
respectively as ￿n = mn + ! and ￿g = mg + !. Let us now analyze the e⁄ect of the tax
under di⁄erent assumptions concerning the wage bargaining. Speci￿cally, we address the cases
of right-to-manage and e¢ cient bargaining.
1.
x w w g n = =
) /( t t + 1 x
l
0
w
1 -
n l
1 -
g l
w
mn mg
Figure 1: The pivotal role of the norm
4.1 Right-to-manage
In the right-to-manage bargaining model, the ￿rm is responsible for the choice of labor but
bargains with the union about the wage paid. In other words, the wage is bargained subject to
the constraint that the ￿rm chooses the employment level on its labor demand curve. The wage
bargaining may be represented by the maximization of the Nash product
Max
wn
fl[wn ￿ !]g
￿ ff(l) ￿ l[wn (1 + ￿) ￿ ￿x]g
1￿￿ (7)
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7subject to (3), where ￿ 2 [0;1] represents the union bargaining power in the wage negotiation.
Substituting for (3), the ￿rst order condition for this expression is
￿
￿
1 + ￿
fll(l)
￿
fl(l) + ￿x
1 + ￿
￿ !
￿
+ l
￿
ff(l) ￿ lfl(l)g
= (1 ￿ ￿)l2(1 + ￿) ￿
￿
fl(l) + ￿x
1 + ￿
￿ !
￿
(8)
which can be represented by an implicit function F (l;!;x;￿;￿) and yields the equilibrium
employment.
Proposition 1: For the parameter set x > !, ￿ > 0 and ￿ 2 [0;1], under right-to-manage wage
bargaining, employment at the ￿rm level is monotonically increasing in the norm x and in the
tax rate ￿ if and only if Fl > 0 with
Fl = (fl(l) + ￿x ￿ ! (1 + ￿))
￿
￿ ff(l) ￿ lfl(l)g
￿flll(l)
[fll(l)]
2 ￿ l(2 ￿ ￿)
￿
+2￿ ff(l) ￿ lfl(l)g ￿ l2fll(l) .
Proof. From the implicit function theorem, we may compute the ￿rst derivative of labor with
respect to ￿ and x respectively as ￿F￿
Fl and ￿Fx
Fl with
F￿ = (x ￿ !)
￿
￿
f(l) ￿ lfl(l)
fll(l)
￿ l2(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
Fx = ￿
￿
￿
f(l) ￿ lfl(l)
fll(l)
￿ l2(1 ￿ ￿)
￿
and we observe that F￿ and Fx are both negative under our assumption of a concave production
function.
Let us now illustrate the proposition by considering some examples. Investigating ￿rst the
extreme cases ￿ = 0 (the ￿rm sets unilaterally wage and labor) and ￿ = 1 (monopoly union)
provides some indications about the mechanism of the tax.
Example 1: Let us consider ￿ = 0. In this case the ￿rm maximizes its pro￿t by setting the net
wage at the reservation level ! while the corresponding employment on the labor demand curve
is l￿ = f￿1
l (!(1 + ￿) ￿ ￿x), increasing in both x and ￿ for x > !.
It is obvious in this case that Lemma 1 alone explains the e⁄ect of the tax. As illustrated
in Figure 1, the labor demand l￿1
n pivots counterclockwise with the tax rate ￿ around the norm
x in the labor-wage plane, and as long as the norm x is above the reservation wage !, the
intersection of the l￿1
n curve with the reservation wage is pushed to the right as either x or ￿
increases. The mechanism has a positive impact on employment for x > !, the last statement
providing a justi￿cation for the restriction x > ! used in Proposition 1: it prevents a perverse
e⁄ect of the norm.
9
8Example 2: In the monopoly union case (￿ = 1), the trade union simply maximizes its objective
function subject to the labor demand constraint. The ￿rst order condition (8) becomes
l￿ = ￿
fl(l￿) + ￿(x ￿ !) + !
fll(l￿)
and employment is increasing in both x and ￿ for x > !:
The e⁄ect of the tax on employment is here explained by Lemma 2 and is illustrated on Figure
2. The trade union sets employment such that ￿n = !, determining the equilibrium employment
l￿. Given this employment, the equilibrium net and gross wages (w￿
n and w￿
g) are determined
respectively by the l￿1
n and l￿1
g labor demand curves. Note that the norm x pushes upward
the marginal revenue curve while the tax rate ￿ pivots counterclockwise the marginal revenue
around the norm x in the labor-wage plane. Therefore, higher norm and tax push rightward
the intersection of the ￿n curve with the reservation wage ! as long as x > !, implying higher
employment. Given this employment, the wage is determined by the labor demand curve, and
according to Lemma 1 it is decreasing in the norm and tax.
1.
x
) /( t t + 1 x
l
0
w 1 -
n l
1 -
g l
w
mn mg
* l
*
n w
*
g w
Figure 2: Wage-labor determination in the monopoly union case
Let us now come back to the more general case with ￿ 2 [0;1] and consider a speci￿c
production function rather standard in economics.
Example 3: Let us assume an isoelastic production function f(l) = l￿, with ￿ 2 ]0;1[. Substi-
tuting for this functional form in the ￿rst order condition (8), we obtain after some manipulations
10
9the following expression for labor at the ￿rm level
l￿ =
￿
￿ (￿(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿)(! ￿ x) + ￿!(1 ￿ ￿) + ￿!
￿2
￿ 1
￿￿1
and employment is increasing in both x and ￿ for x > !:
The latter example proves that, under fairly standard assumptions, the condition Fl > 0 can
be ful￿lled such that both the norm and the tax (subsidy) of the wage above (below) the norm
have a positive impact on labor in a right-to-manage wage bargaining set-up.
4.2 E¢ cient bargaining
Under the e¢ cient bargaining assumption, the ￿rm and the union bargain simultaneously over
wage and labor, using for both negotiations the same bargaining power ￿ 2 [0;1]. This amounts
to assume that wage and labor are decided through a Nash bargaining procedure:
Max
wn;l
fl ￿ (wn ￿ !)g
￿ ￿ ff(l) ￿ l ￿ [wn(1 + ￿) ￿ ￿x]g
1￿￿ . (9)
Proposition 2: For the parameter set x > !, ￿ 2 [0;1] and ￿ 2 [0;1], under e¢ cient bargain-
ing, employment at the ￿rm level is monotonically increasing in the norm x and in the tax rate
￿.
Proof. Combining the ￿rst order conditions for wn and l, we obtain the usual expressions for
equilibrium employment and wage
l￿ = f￿1
l (! ￿ ￿ (x ￿ !)) ,
w￿
n = ￿
 
f(l)
l + ￿x
1 + ￿
!
+ (1 ￿ ￿)! ,
and we conclude that equilibrium employment is increasing in x and ￿.
Noteworthy, labor is set at the same level as in the right-to-manage case with no bargaining
power examined in Example 1 supra. The intuition behind this outcome is easy to grasp. Under
e¢ cient bargaining, the ￿rm and the union maximize the join pro￿t of their collaboration and
share it accordingly to their respective bargaining power. As pro￿t is maximized when the
productivity of the marginal labor unit is equal to the reservation wage, labor depends only
on the ln labor demand curve and its intersection with !. From Lemma 1, we know that the
norm mechanism ￿ attens the labor demand curve and shift rightward its intersection with the
reservation wage.
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104.3 The tax only case
Proposition 1 and 2 consider the mechanism of the norm but keeps away from the tax/subsidy
discussion. However, the tax-only case is worth considering, since, with the exception of East
Germany, no transition country has thought of subsidizing wages and none could indeed a⁄ord
it. Let us thus consider how the above outcomes would be modi￿ed in the case
T = ￿ max(wn ￿ x;0) .
The ￿rst e⁄ect will be to a⁄ect Lemma 1 and 2. It limits the pivotal role of the norm to the
section of the labor demand curve above the norm, creating a kink in x. This means that limiting
the mechanism to the tax case kills the employment enhancing e⁄ect of the norm for all the
wage bargainings considered such that this e⁄ect happened through the counterclockwise shift
of the lower part of the labor demand curve.
This is in particular true for the right-to-manage case with ￿ = 0 since the crossing of the
labor demand and the reservation wage that determines equilibrium labor occurs below the
kink in x since we imposed x > !. This is also true of the e¢ cient bargaining, since ￿rm and
union maximize the pro￿t from their collaboration and choose the same employment level as the
￿rm would, had it the right to set wage at its desired level. From this, we derive the following
proposition:
Proposition 3: If one excludes to subsidize wage and considers only T = ￿ max(wn ￿ x;0),
taxing wages in excess of a norm cannot have any e⁄ect on employment if the latter is set
e¢ ciently, that is, in order to maximize the ￿rm production.
It is interesting in the light of this Proposition to remember that the Akerlof et al. (1991)
proposal of a wage subsidy for Eastern Germany allows to circumvent this potential drawback.
However, as explained in Section 2, the dominant feeling is that employment was not decided
e¢ ciently in Eastern countries during the transition period. With that respect, the right-to-
manage type of bargaining with ￿ > 0 is probably a better representation of the labor-wage
decision at the ￿rm level. Noteworthy, Proposition 1 remains valid for all the cases where the
norm x is set below the equilibrium net wage wn. Even more, since Proposition 1 establishes
that employment at the ￿rm level is monotonically increasing with the norm, we can state the
following corollary:
Corollary 1: Considering the same economy as in Proposition 1 and assuming that condition
Fl > 0 holds, if the government levies a tax in case of excess wages but refuses to pay a subsidy
in the opposite situation, employment at the ￿rm level is maximized if the norm is set such that
x = wn.
In other words, the employment e⁄ect of the tax on wage excess is maximized when the
norm is set such that, in the corresponding equilibrium, no tax is levied. Figure 3 illustrates
12
11this corollary for the special case of the monopoly union (right-to-manage with ￿ = 1). The l￿1
n
curve is truncated below the norm x and beyond the corresponding equilibrium employment
level lx: Hence, the corresponding ￿n curve doesn￿ t apply beyond lx, inducing a discontinuity
in the net marginal revenue curve, with a jump from ￿n to ￿g. There is a norm x￿ de￿ned
as x such that ￿n(lx￿) = !. For this norm x￿, employment is maximized at lx￿. If the norm
x rises further, the l￿1
n and ￿n curves shift upward and to the left, and the ￿n curve doesn￿ t
cross the ! line anymore. Eventually the ￿g curve applies again and the high norm becomes
irrelevant. If the government doesn￿ t want to pay a subsidy and has enough information about
the reservation wage ! and the ￿n curve of the union given the labour demand of the ￿rm, it
can try to set the norm at x￿ to maximize unemployment at lx￿. Anyway a high norm cannot
deliver less employment than no norm.
1.
) /( t t + 1 x
l
0
w 1 -
n l
1 -
g l
w
mn mg
* x l
Figure 3: Employment maximizing norm in the tax only case and monopoly union
5 Empirical estimation of the e⁄ect of the wage norm
Lemma 1 and 2 show that both the net labor demand and the net marginal revenue curves
move upward with the norm (norm-leverage e⁄ect) and rotate around it (tax rate e⁄ect) when
compared to the gross labor demand and gross marginal revenue curves. We established in the
previous section that these properties cannot lead to an employment increase if the government
restricts the mechanism to the case of a tax and that the wage/labor bargaining procedure
within the ￿rm maximizes production.
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12However, there is a old debate among economists about the bargaining procedures between
unions and ￿rms, and the suspicion that these procedures do not lead to the optimal level of
employment is even bigger in the particular case of Eastern countries in transition. Under right-
to-manage bargaining, Proposition 1 establishes the condition for the tax on wage excess to lead
to a higher level of employment, provided the norm is set above the reservation wage. Example
2 and 3 prove that this condition is for sure ful￿lled in the case of a monopoly union or for
such a consensual production function as f(l) = l￿ and Corollary 1 states that these results are
maintained even if the mechanism is discontinuous and does not allow the tax to turn into a
subsidy.
The foundation of the employment e⁄ect of the tax in the pivotal role of the norm can be
tested with ￿rm-level data on wages and employment, by estimating an inverse labor demand,
that is a wage equation.
In equations (4) and (5) we expressed the relation between the inverse ￿ net￿labor demand
and the inverse ￿ gross￿labor demand as :
wn(l) = l￿1
n =
l￿1
g + ￿x
1 + ￿
.
We can thus write a wage equation relating the net wage to the usual determinants of the gross
wage and to the norm x. If the coe¢ cient of the norm is signi￿cant, it indicates that the norm
played a role in the wage determination. Moreover we can interpret the estimated coe¢ cients
as re￿ ecting the actual value of the tax rate ￿.
We specify a logarithmic wage equation to be estimated. In order to identify the relevant
variables and coe¢ cients, let us start from a general isoelastic labor demand of the type l =
Aw
￿￿
g , where A is a shift variable driven, for example, by the sale of output by the ￿rm, wg is
the gross wage, and ￿ > 0 is the elasticity of labor demand to the gross wage. For the ￿rms
to which the tax does not apply, the isoelastic labor demand curve gives immediately the wage
equation :
lnwn =
1
￿
lnA ￿
1
￿
lnl when x > wn = wg . (10a)
For the ￿rms to which the tax applies, we substitute for wn according to (4), and obtain
lnwn =
1
￿ (1 + ￿)
lnA ￿
1
￿ (1 + ￿)
lnl +
￿
1 + ￿
lnx + R for x ￿ wn ￿ wg (10b)
from a ￿rst-order Taylor approximation6 with R, the remainder of the approximation. For the
￿rms with an average net wage wn above the wage norm x, an important advantage of this
formulation is that ￿, the taxation rate, and ￿, the wage elasticity of the labor demand, appear
in the coe¢ cients to be estimated. By construction this formulation is coherent with Lemma 1
and expression (5) and poses that the e⁄ect of the tax is the same on all coe¢ cients of the wage
equation.
We index the ￿rms of the sample by i, pool them all in a single regression and we let the
coe¢ cients vary by using a multiplicative binary variable Di = 1 for ￿rms with wages above the
6The detail of the derivation of the approximation can be found in de Crombrugghe and de Walque (1997).
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13norm (wni > xi) and Di = 0 for the other ￿rms (wni ￿ xi). The equation to be estimated in
cross-section by ordinary least squares becomes:
lnwni = ￿0 + ￿0Di + ￿1 lnAi + ￿1Di lnAi
+￿2 lnli + ￿2Di lnli + ￿3Di lnxi + "i . (10c)
In order to estimate this equation, we use a unique ￿rm-level data set assembled by Pinto,
Belka and Krajewski (1993) for their early study of the behavior of 75 Polish state ￿rms in
transition and that these authors kindly accepted to provide us. The data set contains monthly
observations of the average net wage, the wage norm, the employment and the sales of 43 ￿rms7
for 1990 and 1991. Firm-level data for such variables during the transition period are not easily
available. Moreover, this sample has the advantage that it is complemented by interviews of the
managers and that it has received some attention in other papers (among others Pinto and van
Wijnbergen, 1995) which facilitates its interpretation.
Table 1 : Summary of the data (periodical averages across ￿rms)
sample size: 1989 1990 1991 1992
43 manufacturing ￿rms Jul.-Dec. Jan.-Dec. Jan.-Dec. Jan.-June
Employment per ￿rm 3,928 4,099 3,244 2,863
(coe¢ cient of variation across ￿rms) 0.53 0.70 0.53 0.58
Wage per worker (monthly in 1000 zl) 354 1,052 1,729 2,506
(coe¢ cient of variation across ￿rms) 0.17 0.24 0.19 0.24
Norm per worker (in 1000 zl) n.a. 900 2084 2,611
(coe¢ cient of variation across ￿rms) 0.21 1.07 0.67
Sales per worker (in 1000 zl) n.a. 19,542 25,280 n.a.
(coe¢ cient of variation across ￿rms) 0.70 0.88
Excess-wage tax per worker (in 1000 zl) n.a. 251 419 99
(coe¢ cient of variation across ￿rms) 1.26 1.47 2.27
Notes: Sales per worker and excess-wage tax per worker computed as monthly average over the year,
that is end of year cumulative value/(12￿ average employment over the year).
Exchange rate on Jan. 1, 1990 : USD 1 = 10,000 PLZ (zl).
Source: Pinto, Belka & Krajewski (1993) sample, own treatment of data provided by Piotr Urbanek,
University of Lodz.
Table 1 reports summary data of the variables we use. The fall in employment appears in
1991 and 1992. Real wages fell in 1990 and rose in 1991 and 1992; indeed, the in￿ ation and
devaluations of 1989 hurted the real wages in 1989-90 despite the nominal increase. The excess
wage tax liability per worker is high, but this hides huge variations across ￿rms. The average
7Some of the 75 ￿rms of the original sample do no report all the necessary data.
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14monthly sales per worker also vary widely across ￿rms and even more so in 1991 than in 1990;
this may indeed a⁄ect the bargaining relations between employers and employees across ￿rms.
The sales variable is thus relevant in the wage equation next to the employment and the norm.
We estimate separate regressions for 1990 and 1991 and use arithmetic averages of the
variables over 12 months. This choice follows the institutional reality of both the tax system and
the wage setting process. Indeed, the tax underwent signi￿cant changes about once a year.8 The
wages could be revised every month and employment ￿ uctuated monthly as well. Nevertheless,
most of the Polish data show a seasonal pattern for wages, with high bonuses paid in the fourth
quarter and a real wage drop in January, which all indicate that the monthly wages should be
seen as part of an annual package. The wage norm x is also di⁄erent each month within a
￿rm and across ￿rms, and the tax is due on monthly excesses but the overall tax liability is
determined once at the end of the year. From this, we conclude that the appropriate time span
is one year and that the arithmetic average of each variable over the twelve months contains
useful information that would be lost if we simply used point to point observations.
Table 2 reports our estimates. It presents ￿ve regressions for each year. The ￿rst three partly
omit the dummies, while the fourth one corresponds to equation (10c) but without restriction
on the estimated coe¢ cients. The ￿fth regression tests the restriction that the coe¢ cients on
sales and employment in (10c) are equal in absolute value as implied by (10a) and (10b). The
last two speci￿cations have a better ￿t, especially in 1990.
In the ￿fth regression, the constraint on the coe¢ cients is not rejected and the size of the
coe¢ cients is compatible with their economic interpretation. Indeed (10b) suggests that ￿3, the
coe¢ cient of the norm x, can give an estimate of the tax rate ￿ : ￿ = ￿3=(1 ￿ ￿3). We thus
obtain ￿90 ’ 3;52 and ￿91 ’ 0;71 in R5 and ￿90 ’ 6;09 and ￿91 ’ 0;65 in R4. The absolute
size of these tax rates corresponds to tax rates actually imposed in these years and their relative
size from one year to the other re￿ ects the general reduction of the rates in 1991.
For tax-liable ￿rms, the dampening e⁄ect of the tax on the wage e⁄ect of sales and em-
ployment appears in the coe¢ cients associated with the multiplicative dummy. The coe¢ cient
associated with the multiplicative dummy is of the opposite sign and of smaller absolute value
than the ￿ gross￿coe¢ cient for the same variable. This con￿rms the wage dampening e⁄ect of
the tax and especially its ability to increase the wage elasticity of the labor demand.
The wage elasticity of the labor demand is the inverse value of the coe¢ cient of employment
in the estimated equation (￿ = 1=￿2). Then, R1 implies an point estimate of ￿ of 4;83 in 1990
and of 4;29 in 1991, which is su¢ ciently above 1 for a standard monopoly model to apply. In
the full regressions R4 and R5, the ￿ net￿labor demand wage elasticity is the inverse of the sum
of the two coe¢ cients on employment (￿=(1 + ￿) = 1=(￿2 + ￿2)). It can be computed that R4
and R5 imply ￿ point estimates of 26 and 12 respectively for 1990, which is quite high. For 1991
the estimates drops to 6;1 and 6;9. All these estimates are higher than the estimates in R1 for
the corresponding year or than the coe¢ cient for ￿rms not subject to the tax.
8The norm for 1990 was based on the September wage bill for each ￿rm. The norm for 1991 was about 15
percent above what it would have been without adjustment (see Coricelli and Revenga, 1992).
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15Table 2: Estimation of equation (10c)
Dependent variable is ln(wni) 43 observations
R1 R2 R3 R4 R5b
year 1990a
cst: 1.504￿ 1.175 1.493￿ 0.175 1.171￿
(5.513) (0.104) (5.696) (0.160) (4.592)
Di 1.462 -0.313 -0.843
(0.858) (-0.275) (-2.594)
ln(salesi) 0.201￿ 0.274￿ 0.177￿ 0.275￿ 0.260￿
(7.566) (2.729) (6.225) (4.185) (3.947)
Di ￿ ln(salesi) -0.091 -0.199￿ -0.182￿
(-0.867) (-2.844) (-2.589)
ln(li) -0.207￿ -0.159 -0.182￿ -0.159 -0.260￿
(-6.221) (-0.830) (-5.349) (-1.272) (-3.947)
Di ￿ ln(li) -0.035 0.121 0.182￿
(-0.180) (0.356) (2.589)
Di ￿ ln(xi) 0.061￿ 0.859￿ 0.779￿
(2.089) (7.141) (6.690)
R2
adj: 0.585 0.580 0.617 0.821 0.809
year 1991a
cst: 2.396￿ 2.431 2.474￿ 2.431￿ 1.468￿
(11.408) (4.948) (11.026) (5.479) (7.351)
Di -0.050 -1.157 -0.431
(-0.090) (-1.869) (-1.087)
ln(salesi) 0.182￿ 0.251￿ 0.172￿ 0.251￿ 0.304￿
(9.018) (4.567) (7.703) (5.057) (6.498)
Di ￿ ln(salesi) -0.092 -0.107 -0.158￿
(-1.452) (-1.987) (-3.043)
ln(li) -0.233￿ -0.348￿ -0.232￿ -0.348￿ -0.304￿
(-8.540) (-6.561) (-8.467) (-7.265) (-6.498)
Di ￿ ln(li) 0.153￿ 0.184￿ 0.158￿
(2.509) (3.283) (3.043)
Di ￿ ln(xi) 0.015 0.394￿ 0.416￿
(0.987) (3.061) (3.129)
R2
adj: 0.690 0.718 0.690 0.770 0.743
numbers into brackets are t-statistics
￿ means that the coe¢ cient is signi￿cant at the 5 percent level
a Di = 0 for 5 ￿rms in 1990 and 11 ￿rms in 1991
b estimated imposing ￿1 = ￿￿1 and ￿2 = ￿￿2. The restriction
is not rejected at the ￿ve percents level in 1990, and at the 1 percent
level in 1991.
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16Our estimates of the labor demand curve in 1990 and 1991 for 43 Polish ￿rms do not reject
our model of the e⁄ect of the norm on the perception of the labor demand at the level of the
￿rm. As the marginal revenue curve is directly linked to the labor demand curve (Lemma 2),
our estimates suggest that the norm should also have induced a counterclockwise shift of the
marginal revenue curve, favouring employment in a monopoly union equilibrium (see Example 2
above). Proposition 1, together with Example 3 and Corollary 1, establishes that this outcome
also holds for a wide range of cases in the more general right-to-manage setting.
This supports the claim that the excess-wage tax has indeed been favorable to employment
in Poland in the early transition years 1990-1991 and that it may have protected ￿rms from
excessive decapitalization by protecting the employer surplus from excessive wage claims.
Our results on the role of the wage norm complement those of Pinto and van Wijnbergen
(1995). They study the wage behavior of the same sample of Polish ￿rms from the ￿ hard budget
constraint￿point of view and they look at the accumulated tax liability as a possible determinant
of feasible wage increases. They regress the quarterly di⁄erence between the growth rate of the
wage bill and the growth rate of the wage norm of the ￿rms on three variables: the growth
rate of their quarterly real gross value added, the growth rate of their quarterly bank borrowing
and the growth rate of their cumulative popiwek liability per employee. They ￿nd that the
cumulative popiwek liability per employee has a signi￿cant negative e⁄ect on the growth rate of
the wage bill above the wage norm. The evidence is thus compatible with the hypothesis that
the popiwek played its role through a labor demand e⁄ect to moderate wage claims in Poland￿ s
early transition years.
6 Conclusion
Transition economies faced speci￿c challenges on their labor market. Wage and price liber-
alization in still imperfectly competitive markets could have led to excessive increases with
undesirable redistribution, decapitalization and unemployment e⁄ects. Production restructur-
ing and privatization could have induced large reallocations of labor, which in turn could have
caused high unemployment rates, with a risk of reform reversal or of persistence of unemploy-
ment. In this context, a tax-enforced wage norm was imposed on state ￿rms in Poland, as in
many transition countries.
Our theoretical analysis of the tax-enforced wage norm on the labor demand curve shows
two e⁄ects: a norm leverage e⁄ect that shifts the labor demand curve upwards with the norm
and a tax rate e⁄ect that ￿ attens the labor demand curve. The rotation of the labor demand
curve unambiguously increases equilibrium employment and lowers the equilibrium wage in a
pure monopoly union model and in a wide range of right-to-manage models. Introducing the
possibility for the tax to turn into a subsidy for wages below the norm extends the positive
employment e⁄ect of the norm to the e¢ cient-bargaining model.
The empirical estimate of a wage equation on a cross-section of Polish ￿rms con￿rms the
18
17signi￿cant e⁄ect of the norm on the net wage for a given level of employment and the slope-
￿ attening e⁄ect of the tax rate on the coe¢ cients of sales and of employment. This adds to
other evidence that the norm indeed moderated the wages reached in state ￿rms. In the Polish
transition context the positive employment e⁄ect of the tax-enforced wage norm will have taken
the form of a slower aggregate increase in unemployment during the ￿rst critical years.
The way to deal with imperfectly competitive goods and labor markets remains an issue
today in most countries of Europe, East and West alike. A market-entry link between wage
moderation and product market competition (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003) may shed some
light on the issues of today as well as of the transition of the 1990￿ s. The labor demand e⁄ect of
the wage norm on equilibrium wages and employment might thus be studied in various contexts
of macroeconomic policy or of tax policy.
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